UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-6-2010

State v. Flowers Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 36036

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Flowers Respondent's Brief 1 Dckt. 36036" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2523.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2523

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HALTON FLOWERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

IDJ.1AIt1~lJ---'"

COpy

NO. 36036

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BANNOCK

HONORABLE PETER D. MCDERMOTT
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
BOise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

GREG S. SILVEY
Silvey Law Office, Ltd.
PO Box 956
Kuna, ID 83643
(208) 922-1700

FILED- COpy
MAY

620ft]

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................... ",.,,1
Nature of the Case .... ,', .. ,... ,... ,... ,.. ,.. ,., .. ,.,., ..... , ........ ", .... " .... ,... " .... ,.. , .. 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings .................................. ,1
ISSUES" .... ,., ......... ",., .. " ..... """ ...... ,... """', .... ,... ,.. ".,', ...... ,.,""""""',." ......... 3
ARGUMENT ..... ,",., .. ,..... ,""', .... ,.... " .. ,',.,: ....... ,.. ,',., ....... ,.. ".,", .. ,................... .4
I.

Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of
Discretion In The Denial Of His Post-Sentencing
Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea ................................. .4

A.

Introduction ,.. ,.......... ,.... " ........... ,', .. " ........ ,.. ,... " .. ,""", .. ,.4

B,

Standard Of Review, ....................................................... .4

C.

Flowers Failed To Establish Any Manifest Injustice
Entitling Him To Withdraw His Guilty Plea ...................... .4
1.

Flowers Has Failed To Show Entitlement
To Withdrawal Of His Plea Based Upon His
Unfounded Claims That The District Court
Never Actually Accepted His Plea Or That
It Did So In Violation Of I.C.R, 11(c) ...................... 5

2.

The Violation Of I.C.R. 11(d)(2) Does Not
Rise To Level Of Manifest Injustice Entitling
Flowers To Withdraw His Plea ............................... 9

3,

Flowers' Claim That The State Breached
The Plea Agreement At Sentencing Is
Without Merit And Does Not Show Any
Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To Withdraw
His Plea, .. ", .......... , .. ,.. ,............. ,.. ,.. ,', .. ,..... ,..... ,.... 13

4.

II.

Flowers' Claim That The State Breached
The Plea Agreement By Opposing His
Rule 35 Motion Is Without Merit And Does
Not Show Any Manifest Injustice Entitling
Him To Withdraw His Plea ................................... 18

Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The
Sentencing Court's Discretion .................................................. 21

A.

Introduction ....................................................................21

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 21

C.

Flowers Has Failed To Establish That His
Sentence Is Excessive Under Any Reasonable
View Of The Facts ......................................................... 22

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................26
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................... 27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE

CASES

Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 754 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1988) ........................... 5
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999) ........................................ 10, 11
Santobelio v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) .................................................... 14
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................... 5
State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576,38 P.3d 614 (2001) ........................................... 22
State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569,861 P.2d 1234 (Ct. App. 1993) ..................... .4
State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807,10 P.3d 756 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................ 15
State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990) ..................................... .4
State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782,918 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1996) ....................... 14
State v. Cole, 135 Idaho 269, 16 P.3d 945 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................ 19
State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481,861 P.2d 51 (1993) ............................................. .4
State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 52 P.3d 886 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................ 19
State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 857 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993) ........................... 5
State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161,206 P.3d 867 (Ct. App. 2009) ................. 18
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 55 P.3d 879 (Ct. App. 2002) ......................... 11
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,159 P.3d 838 (2007) ..................................... 22
State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584,532 P.2d 926 (1975) ......................................... .4
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299,77 P.3d 988 (2003) ........................................... 14
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,223 P.3d 750 (2010) ......................... 14,20,21
State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608,903 P.2d 1305 (1995) ................................... 14
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,11 P.3d 27 (2000) ....................................... 22

iii

State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577,808 P.2d 1322 (1991) ......................................... 6
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ........................................... 6
State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616, 130 P.3d 1154 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................ 7
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 170 P.3d 387 (2007) .......................................... 22
State v. Peterson, _Idaho _,226 P.3d 535 (2010) .................................... 17
State v. Richards, 1271daho 31, 896 P.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1995) ......................... 15
State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 191 P.3d 217 (2008) ...................................... 21
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330,208 P.3d 134 (Ct. App. 2009) ......................... 5, 6
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,50 P.3d 472 (2002) .......................................... 22
State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800,992 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1999) .................. 16, 17
State v. Tinico-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 179 P.3d 363 (Ct. App. 2008) ................. 10
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) .......................... 21
State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999) ....................................... 22
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89,90 P.3d 314 (2004) ............................................ 10
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) ............................ 10,11
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979) ............................................... 10

RULES
I.C.R. 11 ...................................................................................................... passim
I.C.R. 33 ............................................................................................................ 2, 5

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-1714 ....................................................................................................... 2

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Halton Flowers appeals from the sentence imposed upon his guilty plea to
rape and from the district court's order denying his post-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August 2007 police received information that 24-year-old Flowers had
sexual intercourse with 16-year-old AC., fondled and digitally penetrated 14year-old A.T.'s vagina, and attempted to fondle 15-year-old H.T.'s breasts and
vagina, all within a one-week period. (R., pp.27, 31, 79-80; PSI, p.2.) The state
charged Flowers with rape, lewd conduct with a child under 16, and attempted
lewd conduct with a child under 16.

(R., pp.79-81.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Flowers pled guilty to rape and the state dismissed the remaining
charges and agreed to recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three
years fixed.

(R., pp.165-67; 11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.)

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.168-70.)
Flowers filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district
court denied.

(R., pp.171-72, 181a-181b.)

Flowers filed a notice of appeal,

timely from the judgment. (R., pp.173-75.)
Nine months later, while his appeal was pending, Flowers filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and an affidavit in support thereof.

(Augmentation:

"Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty" (hereinafter cited as "Motion") and "Affidavit
Of Defendant" (hereinafter cited as "Affidavit").) As the bases for his motion,
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Flowers asserted: (1) his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
made because he was not advised, prior to entry of the plea, of the requirement
that he register as a sex offender, in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2); (2) the district
court never actually accepted the plea; and (3) the state breached the plea
agreement both at sentencing and at the hearing on Flowers' Rule 35 motion.
(Motion, p.2; Affidavit, pp.1-3.)

After a hearing, the district court denied the

motion, ruling that Flowers had failed to establish any manifest injustice entitling
him to withdraw his plea. (Augmentation: "Order Denying Motion To Withdraw
Plea Of Guilty Pursuant To I.C.R. 33(c) And Idaho Code § 19-1714" (hereinafter
cited as "Order"); 11/10109 Tr., p.3, L.8 - p.4, L.11.)

2

ISSUES
Flowers states the issues on appeal as:
[1.]

. Whether the district court erred in denying the Rule 33
motion for withdrawal of guilty plea[?]

[2.]

Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing the
defendant to 15 years with the first 5 years fixed?

(Set forth, respectively, at Supplemental Brief Of Appellant ("Supplemental
Brief'). p.2; Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Flowers failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the denial of his
post-sentencing motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea?

2.

Has Flowers failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, upon his
guilty plea to rape?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His
Post-Sentencing Motion For Withdrawal Of His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Flowers contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his

post-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Supplemental Brief, pp. 1022.)

The record, however, supports the district court's determination that

Flowers failed to demonstrate any manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his
plea. Flowers has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481,483,861 P.2d
51,53 (1993); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990);
State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975). On appeal from
the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate
court examines the entire record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust to
preclude the defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Banuelos, 124
Idaho 569,574,861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

Flowers Failed To Establish Any Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after

sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990);
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Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A
court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only
upon a satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). The strictness of the
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea. "A plea of guilty has
the same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits."
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The
stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not "encouraged to plead
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the
sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d
734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea
should be withdrawn.

kL.;

State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656,

657 (Ct. App. 1993).
Flowers asserts several bases he contends rise to the level of manifest
injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea. He has failed, however, to satisfy his
burden of showing an abuse of discretion by the district court.

1.

Flowers Has Failed To Show Entitlement To Withdrawal Of His
Plea Based Upon His Unfounded Claims That The District Court
Never Actually Accepted His Plea Or That It Did So In Violation Of
I.C.R. 11(c)

Flowers pled guilty to statutory rape in exchange for the dismissal of the
other charges alleged in the Information. (11/10108 Tr., p.1, L.13 - p.2, L.10.)
After establishing a factual basis for the plea (11/10108 Tr., p.2, L.11 - p.3, L.6),
the district court stated: "I accept the plea of guilty to count one, and I'll grant the
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state's motion, count two is dismissed, count three is dismissed" (11/10/08 Tr.,
p.3, Ls.7-9). The court then engaged in an extensive colloquy with Flowers to
establish the voluntariness of his plea but never again explicitly stated that it was
accepting his plea. (See generally, 11/10/08 Tr., pp.3-10.)
As he did below, Flowers argues as a basis for withdrawal of his plea that
the district court never actually accepted his plea. (Supplemental Brief, pp.2021; see also Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2.)

This claim is entirely without merit

because, as even Flowers' appellate counsel acknowledges (see Supplemental
Brief, p.21), the district court explicitly stated that it accepted Flowers' plea after
Flowers entered it and agreed there was a factual basis to support it (11/10/08
Tr., p.2, LA - p.3, L.9). Flowers' unfounded claim that the district court never
accepted his plea does not show any manifest injustice, or even a "just reason,"
entitling him to withdraw his plea.
As an altemative basis for withdrawal of his plea, Flowers argues on
appeal that the district court violated I.C.R. 11 (c) by stating that it accepted
Flowers' guilty plea before ensuring that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. (Supplemental Brief, pp.21-22.) Flowers did not advance this argument
in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and, as such, the argument is not
properly before this Court on appeal. State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333-34,
208 P.3d 734, 737-38 (Ct. App. 2009) (basis for withdrawal of plea not raised to
the trial court was not preserved for consideration on appeal); see also State v.
Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991) (issues not raised
below will not be considered for the first time on appeal); State v. Mauro, 121
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Idaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991) (same); State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho
616,623, 130 P.3d 1154, 1161 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). However, even if this
Court considers the merits of Flowers' claim, Flowers has failed to show any
violation of the rule, much less a violation entitling him to withdraw his plea.
When a defendant enters a guilty plea, I.C.R. 11 (c) requires a showing
from the record of the entire proceedings that the plea is constitutionally valid
before the court accepts it. See I.C.R. 11 (c) ("Before a plea of guilty is accepted,
the record of the entire proceedings ... must show" that the plea is voluntary, that
the defendant was informed of the direct consequences of the plea, that the
defendant was advised of the constitutional rights he would waive by pleading
guilty, and whether the plea rests on any promises or is the result of a plea
agreement). Although the district court only explicitly stated that it was accepting
Flowers'

plea

before

it specifically

inquired

of Flowers

regarding

the

voluntariness of his plea, it is clear from a review of record that the court actually
accepted the plea only after determining it was knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily made.
After being advised of the plea bargain and establishing a factual basis for
the plea, the district court engaged Flowers in an extensive plea colloquy, during
which it established that Flowers was not under the influence of any alcohol or
drugs and that Flowers was satisfied with his attorney's representation.
(11/10108 Tr., p.3, Ls.9-25.)

The court advised Flowers of the maximum

sentence he could receive and also advised him of the constitutional rights he
would be waiving by pleading guilty.

(11/10108 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-17.)
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Flowers

indicated that he understood the maximum penalty and the rights he would be
waiving. (11/10108 Tr., pA, Ls.6, 18.) He also indicated that his attorney had
explained to him what facts the state would have to prove to convict him.
(11/10108 Tr., pA, L.19 - p.5, L.12.) Flowers advised the court that nobody had
threatened him or made any promises to get him to plead guilty. (11/10108 Tr.,
p.5, Ls.13-18.) He also assured the court that he was pleading guilty of his own
free will pursuant to the plea agreement, which he understood was not binding
on the court, and asked to court to accept his plea. (11/10/08 Tr., p.5, L.19 p.6, L.19.) At the conclusion of the colloquy, the court asked the parties whether
there was any reason it should not accept Flowers' plea. (11/10/08 Tr., p.6, L.20
- p.?, L.21.) There being none, the court ordered a PSI and a mental health
evaluation for use at sentencing, set a date for sentencing and remanded
Flowers to custody pending the sentencing hearing. (11/10/08 Tr., p.?, L.22 p.10, L.9.)
Flowers' argument on appeal - that the district court never accepted his
plea "after establishing the requirements of a valid plea mandated by I.C.R.
11(c)" (Supplemental Brief, p.22) - is belied by the record. While it is true that
the court never explicitly stated that it accepted the plea after determining that it
was voluntary, the state is unaware of any requirement, and Flowers has cited to
none, that requires the court to actually utter the words "I accept your plea" in
order to convey that it has done so. Flowers concedes that the court did, in fact,
establish the requirements for a constitutionally valid plea pursuant to I.C.R.
11(c). (Supplemental Brief, pp.21-22.) That the court actually accepted Flowers'
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plea after establishing the Rule 11 (c) requirements is evidenced, at least
implicitly, by the fact that the court asked the parties whether there was any
reason it should not accept the plea and, hearing none, ordered a PSI and
mental health evaluation and set the case for sentencing. Because the record
shQws that the court accepted Flowers' plea only after determining it was
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered, Flowers has failed to show any
violation of I.C.R 11 (c), much less a violation rising to the level of manifest
injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea.

2.

The Violation Of I.C.R. 11(d)(2) Does Not Rise To Level Of
Manifest Injustice Entitling Flowers To Withdraw His Plea

Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (d)(2) states that, if a defendant is pleading guilty
to an offense requiring registration on the sex offender registry, the district court
"shall, prior to entry of [the] plea or the making of factual admissions during a
plea cplloquy ... inform the defendant of such registration requirements." The
district court failed at the change of plea hearing to advise Flowers of the
requirement that he register as a sex offender.

(See generally 11/10/08 Tr .. )

Contrary to Flowers' claims both below and on appeal (Supplemental Brief,
pp.18-20; Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2), however, the violation of Rule 11 (d)(2) does
not rise to the level of either a due process violation or manifest injustice entitling
Flowers to withdraw his plea.
Idaho

Criminal

Rule

11 (c),

not

11 (d),

establishes the

minimum

constitutional requirements for accepting a guilty plea. The requirements of Rule
11(c) constitute procedural safeguards "to protect the underlying constitutional
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requirements

that

guilty please

be

entered

voluntarily,

knowingly

and

intelligently."

State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 95, 90 P.3d 314, 320 (2004).

Where, as here, "the record indicates that the trial court followed the
reqUirements of Rule 11 (c), this is a prima facie showing that the plea is
voluntary and knowing." Weber, 140 Idaho at 95, 90 P.3d at 320. However,
because the procedures of Rule 11 (c) are not. themselves constitutionally
mandated, a violation of the rule does not, by itself, rise to a due process
violation rendering the plea invalid. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542
U.S. 74, 83 (2004); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (a
technical violation of Rule 11 is neither a constitutional nor jurisdictional defect);
Weber, 140 Idaho at 95, 90 P.3d at 320.
Unlike the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c), the requirements of I.C.R.11 (d) do
not protect constitutional rights.

Rather, the provisions of Rule 11(d) address

certain collateral consequences a defendant may face as a result of his or her
plea.

See,~,

Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 101, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (1999) (the

requirement of "sex offender registration [now addressed by Rule 11(d)(2)] is a
collateral, not direct, consequence of pleading guilty"); State v. Tinico-Perez, 145
Idaho 400, 179 P.3d 363 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted) ("[T]he risk of
deportation or other impact on immigration status [now addressed by Rule
11(d)(1)] is generally considered a "collateral consequence" of a criminal
conviction. ").

The

failure

to

advise

a defendant

of these

collateral

consequences, when they apply, undoubtedly constitutes a technical violation of
the rule.

However, because the procedures embodied in Rule 11 (d) are not
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constitutionally required, see, Q.&, Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101, 982 P.2d 934-96;
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002), it
follows that a violation of Rule 11 (d), like a violation of Rule 11 (c), does not rise
to the level of a due process violation rendering the defendant's plea involuntary.
Flowers argues in conclusory fashion that, even if the court's failure to
advise him of the sex offender registration requirement as required by Rule
11 (d)(2) did not constitute a due process violation, its failure to do so
nevertheless resulted in a manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea.
(Supplemental Brief, pp.19-20.)

Flowers appears to claim he was prejudiced

simply by the virtue of the fact that the court did not comply with the rule.
Flowers, however, has never contended that he was not actually aware of the
sex offender registration requirements at the time he entered his plea.
Moreover, it is evident from the record that Flowers was aware of the registration
requirement before he was sentenced on his plea. At the sentencing hearing,
the court specifically asked Flowers: "[S]o you realize that you'll have to register
as a sex offender then, right?" (12/15/08 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-2.) Flowers responded:
"Yes, sir. As long as I'm on probation and even after, if you don't give me a
withheld judgment." (12/15/08 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-4.) Because Flowers proceeded to
sentencing despite being actually aware of the requirement that he register as a
sex offender, he cannot successfully claim on appeal any injustice arising from
the court's failure to comply with Rule 11 (d)(2) at the change of plea hearing.
The reasoning of United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74
(2004), is instructive. In Dominguez Benitez, the United States Supreme Court
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held that a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on
the ground that the district court committed plain error under Federal Criminal
Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
have entered the plea.

In so holding, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth

Circuit, which had held that the district court's failure to issue a particular warning
pursuant to Federal Rule 11(c) required reversal of the defendant's conviction.
The Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind adopting such a rule:
First, the standard should enforce the policies that underpin
Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce
wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for
unpreserved error.
Second, it should respect the particular
importance of the finality of guilty pleas, which usually rest, after all,
in a defendant's profession of guilty in open court, and are
indispensable in the operation of the modern criminal justice
system. And in this case, these reasons are complemented by the
fact, worth repeating, that the violation was of Rule 11, not of due
process.

Flowers, like Dominguez, did not timely object to the alleged failure to
comply with Rule 11. Flowers, like Dominguez, has not shown a violation of due
process, but only a technical violation of Rule 11. Flowers, like Dominguez, has
failed to show that the court's alleged failure made any difference whatsoever
with respect to his decision to enter a guilty plea. To the contrary, the record
shows that Flowers was aware of the registration requirement at least as of the
date of sentencing and expressed no desire to withdraw his plea. Thus, despite
the fact that the court overlooked the requirement of Rule 11 (d)(2) before
accepting Flowers' plea, Flowers has nevertheless failed to show that such an
oversight rose to the level of manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his plea.
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3.

Flowers' Claim That The State Breached The Plea Agreement At
Sentencing Is Without Merit And Does Not Show Any Manifest
Injustice Entitling Him To Withdraw His Plea

At sentencing, Flowers moved to strike a portion of the PSI that referred to
an admission Flowers had made to the presentence investigator in relation to
one of the" charges that had been dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement in
this case.

Specifically, Flowers moved to strike the statement in the PSI that

"Flowers did indicate during our interview that he touched the breasts of A.T., 14year-old female in dismissed charge." (PSI, p.11; 12/15/08 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-18.) In
response to Flowers' motion to strike, the prosecutor argued:
Your Honor, I think the Court can give it whatever weight's
necessary. I would note for the record that that particular individual
is in the courtroom here today, with her mother. While they
understand they are not entitled to give a witness impact
statement, I think the Court can take into consideration the entire
facts regarding the situation. While there was a plea agreement, I
think the Court has a right to understand everything that went on
with Mr. Flowers so it can sentence him appropriately, based upon
all the facts.
(12/15/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-11.)

Subsequently, while making his sentencing

recommendation, the prosecutor argued: "When we're talking about somebody
with this prior record, with this type of conduct, and all the other conducts that
was [sic] surrounded this particular case, this is not a person that should be in
our community. He is a risk to young ladies." (12/15/08 Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.)
As a basis for withdrawing his guilty plea, Flowers argued that, by
commenting on the dismissed charges at sentencing, the prosecutor breached
the plea agreement by "not being reasonably consistent with the agreement and
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their recommendation to dismiss two other charges and not use them against me
later." (Affidavit, p.2; see also Motion, p.2.) Flowers reasserts this argument on
appeal, contending that "regardless of whether or not the court could sua sponte
consider [the dismissed charges], the state acted inconsistently with its promise
to Mr. Flowers when it argued that the court could and should do so."
(Supplemental Brief, p.12.) Flowers has failed to show any breach of the plea
agreement entitling him to withdraw his plea.
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by
contract law standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, _ , 223 P.3d 750,
759 (2010); State v. Claxton, 128 Idaho 782,785,918 P.2d 1227, 1230 (Ct. App.
1996). In making a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement,
the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently
with the terms of the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608,903 P.2d 1305 (1995). The burden is
on the defendant to show that the prosecutor's overall argument disavowed or
was fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to take
pursuant to the plea agreement. Lankford, 127 Idaho at 617,903 P.2d at 1314
(sentence vacated

because the state's

comments

at sentencing were

"fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated to recommend");
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 (2003) (sentence vacated
because

the

recommendation).

prosecutor's

comments

"effectively

disavowed"

the

Consistent with this standard, the state's recommendation

may include information that is unfavorable to the defendant if the information is
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relevant to the court's sentencing determination, and may remind the court of the
applicable legal standards. State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807,810, 10 P.3d 756,
759 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussion of findings contained in the presentencing
psychosexual evaluation does not constitute breach of a plea agreement); State
v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Unless the
State has specifically agreed to the contrary, the prosecutor may legitimately
refer to information relevant to the sentencing determination and may permissibly
refer to the objectives of sentencing.").
The plea agreement in this case was not reduced to writing. However, the
terms of agreement were articulated by the parties at the change of plea hearing,
as follows:
[Defense Counsel): Yes, Your Honor, we do have a plea
agreement on this man, also. He [Flowers) is going to plead guilty
to statutory rape. The State's going to recommend three fixed,
seven indeterminate and they're going to dismiss all other charges
in all other cases. We're free to make our own recommendations
at sentencing.

[Prosecutor): That's correct, Your Honor, I would move at
this time, pursuant to that agreement, to dismiss counts two and
three of the information.
(11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.) In addition, Flowers completed and signed a guilty

plea questionnaire in which he represented his understanding of the terms of the
plea agreement as:
Defense free

to

"Drop count 2 & 3, plead guilty to Rape, 3-7 yrs prison,
recomend

whatever deemed

necessary."

(punctuation added, spelling and abbreviations original).)
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(R.,

p.164

The parties' obligations under the plea agreement are unambiguous.
Pursuant to the agreement, Flowers was required to plead guilty to rape, and the
state was required to dismiss all other charges, which it did, and to recommend a
specific sentence. (R., p.164; 11/10108 Tr., p.1, Ls.13-22.)
Flowers now contends that the state was also obligated under the
agreement not to comment on the charges it dismissed. (Supplemental Brief,
pp.12-13.) To support this assertion, Flowers points to the following comments
made by his trial attorney at sentencing: "I guess I'm concerned - is we have a
plea agreement. The state's bound by the plea agreement, and they're bound to
go along with certain recommendations and not comment on charges that have
been dismissed."

(12/15/08 Tr., p.7, Ls.12-15.)

Flowers' appellate counsel

interprets these comments as an express declaration "that under the plea
agreement the state was bound not to comment on the dismissed charges."
(Supplemental Brief, p.12.) Such an interpretation is not warranted, however,
because it is clear from the parties' articulation of the agreement at the entry of
plea hearing, and from Flowers' own understanding of the terms of the
agreement, as reflected in his guilty plea questionnaire, that such a term was
never part of the agreement.

It is also clear from the context of defense

counsel's comments at sentencing that defense counsel was merely opining that
the state should not comment on the charges it agreed to dismiss, much like he
opined that the court should not even consider the dismissed charges, even
though it was clearly entitled to do so.

See,~,

State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho

800, 804, 992 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted) ("[I]t is well
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established that a sentencing court may, with appropriate caution, consider a
defendant's alleged criminal conduct for which he has not been convicted or for
which charges have been dismissed,"),
This is not a case, as Flowers suggests, like State v, Peterson, _
-'

Idaho

226 P,3d 535 (2010), where the state was bound by the defendant's

understanding of the plea agreement because the prosecutor stood silent in the
face of defense counsel's representation at the change of plea hearing regarding
the meaning of an ambiguous term,

Defense counsel in this case recited the

terms of the plea agreement at the change of plea hearing and neither he nor
Flowers (nor the prosecutor, for that matter) ever indicated that the agreement
bound the state to not comment on the charges it agreed to dismiss, Defense
counsel's subsequent statement of opinion at sentencing that the prosecutor
should not be permitted to comment on the dismissed charges did not alter the
terms of the otherwise unambiguous agreement.
There was no requirement under the agreement that the state not
comment on the dismissed charges, Nor did the comments the prosecutor made
at sentencing in any way disavow the position the state was obligated to take
pursuant to the plea agreement. The prosecutor accurately advised the court in
response to Flowers' motion to strike that the court was entitled to consider
dismissed charges and to give them whatever weight it deemed appropriate,
Thomas, 133 Idaho at 804, 992 P,2d at 799, The prosecutor's response was not
a comment on the dismissed charges at all and was in no way inconsistent with
its obligations under the plea agreement. Nor did the prosecutor undermine the
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agreement by stating during argument that Flowers should not be in the
community in light of "all the other conducts" surrounding this case.

The

promised recommendation was for prison. Pointing out that a prison sentence
was appropriate in light of all the facts the case did not undermine the
sentencing recommendation but, rather, properly buttressed it against defense
counsel's recommendation for probation. See State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho
161, 206 P.3d 867 (Ct. App. 2009) (prosecutor's vigorous argument and
reference to facts of crimes did not undermine or impliedly disavow sentencing
recommendation, but properly buttressed it against any argument from defense
counsel that a lesser sentence was warranted).
Flowers has failed to show that the prosecutor breached the plea
agreement at sentencing and has therefore failed to show he is entitled to
withdraw his plea on that basis.

4.

Flowers' Claim That The State Breached The Plea Aareement Bv
Opposing His Rule 35 Motion Is Without Merit And Does Not Show
Any Manifest Injustice Entitling Him To Withdraw His Plea

At sentencing the state, in accordance with its promise to do so,
recommended a sentence of three years determinate, followed by seven years
indeterminate. (12/15/08 Tr., p.18, Ls.3-5.) The district court ultimately imposed
a sentence of 15 years, with five years determinate. (R., pp.168-70; 12/15/08
Tr., p.22, Ls.6-14.) Flowers filed a Rule 35 motion, requesting that the sentence
be reduced to that recommended by the state at sentencing. (R., pp.171-72.)
The state opposed motion, arguing that the sentence imposed was reasonable.
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(1/26/09 Tr., pA, Ls.12-25.) The court denied Flowers' request for leniency. (R.,

pp.181 a-181 b.)
Flowers argues, as he did below, that prosecutor's agreement to
recommend a sentence of 10 years with three years determinate effectively
barred the state from opposing his Rule 35 motion to reduce the sentence
ultimately imposed. (Supplemental Brief, pp.14-16; Motion, p.2; Affidavit, p.2.)
Flowers' claim does not withstand scrutiny.

The prosecutor's obligation to

recommend a specific sentence at sentencing did not preclude the prosecutor
from asserting at a post-sentencing hearing that Flowers' sentence was
reasonable as imposed.
"The determination of whether the state breached a plea agreement by its
conduct at a post-sentencing proceeding 'generally tums on the language of the
plea agreement itself; and where that language is ambiguous, the ambiguity will
be resolved in favor of the defendant. '" State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745,
52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Cole, 135 Idaho 269, 272, 16
P.3d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2000). In Fuhriman, the defendant pled guilty pursuant
to a plea agreement whereby the parties agreed jointly to recommend "not more
than a rider." Fuhriman, 137 Idaho at 743, 52 P.3d at 888. On appeal from his
conviction, Fuhriman argued that the state breached the plea agreement by
opposing his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

lsi.

at 745, 52 P.3d at

890. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held:
Having already concluded that the plea agreement was not
ambiguous, we decline Fuhriman's invitation to imply additional
terms, viz., that the state was prohibited from opposing his Rule 35
motion, that the parties did not articulate at the time the agreement
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was entered. Further, the record does not indicate that the state
made any affirmative sentencing recommendation at the Rule 35
hearing.
Instead, it merely argued that the court's previous
sentence was reasonable.

The reasoning and result of Fuhriman apply equally to this case.

As

articulated by defense counsel at the change of plea hearing, the plea
agreement in this case required the state "to recommend three fixed, seven
indeterminate," with the defense being "free to make our own recommendations
at sentencing."

(11/10108 Tr., p.1, La.14-18; see also R., p.164 (guilty plea

questionnaire).) As in Fuhriman, at no time did the parties to the agreement ever
articulate as an additional requirement that the state would be prohibited from
opposing Flowers' Rule 35 motion, nor can such a term reasonably be implied in
light of defense counsel's own representation that the recommendations
contemplated by the agreement were to be made "at sentencing." Further, as in
Fuhriman, the record shows that the state did not make any affirmative
sentencing recommendation at the Rule 35 hearing but, instead, merely argued
that the sentence imposed by the court was reasonable. (1/26/09 Tr., pA, Ls.1225.) Because the state never agreed to give up its right to oppose Flowers' Rule
35 motion, Flowers has failed to show that the state breached the plea
agreement by arguing that his sentence was reasonable as imposed.
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2010), relied upon by
Flowers, is distinguishable. In Lampien, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
state was obligated to adhere to its promised sentencing recommendation at
every stage of the proceedings based on the broad and "somewhat unusual
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language of the plea agreement," which provided, "[t]he State and Defendant
agree to be bound to following sentence agreement." hl.,. at _ , 367 P.3d at
761. As set forth above, however, the language of the parties' plea agreement is
not nearly as broad in this case.

The agreement called for the state to

recommend specific sentence but, unlike the agreement in Lampien, it did not
"bind" the state to the sentencing recommendation for all time. Thus, despite
Flowers' assertions to the contrary, nothing in the plea agreement between
Flowers and the state prohibited the prosecutor from asserting at the hearing on
Flowers' Rule 35 motion that Flowers' sentence was reasonable as imposed.
Flowers has failed to show any breach of the plea agreement entitling him to
withdraw his plea.

II.
Flowers Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion
A.

Introduction
Flowers argues that the unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed,

imposed upon his guilty plea to rape is unduly harsh and excessive. (Appellant's
Brief, pp.3-8.)

The record, however, clearly supports the sentence imposed;

Flowers has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a district court's sentencing determination, the question

before this Court is not what sentence it would have imposed, but rather,
whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139,
148-49,191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,
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650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). The length of a sentence is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence.
State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.

l.li (citing

State

v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

c.

Flowers Has Failed To Establish That His Sentence Is Excessive Under
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831,11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence

I

is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to
achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

l.li

Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho
576,577,38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577,
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to
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achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the related
sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.

k!.c

Contrary to

Flowers' assertions on appeal, the facts of this case, combined with Flowers'
criminal history, warrant the sentence imposed.
One day after befriending 16-year-old AC., 24-year-old Flowers engaged
her in a sexual relationship. (PSI, p.2.) The misconduct began when Flowers
and AC. were swimming, at which time Flowers "hugg[ed] and French kiss[ed]"
AC., "unsnapped her bra from behind," and "reached down from the front of her
shirt" and removed her bra "through the neck of her tank top." (PSI, p.2.) AC.
was obviously uncomfortable with Flowers' advances because, from that point
forward, "she kept her distance from him and ... cover[ed] her breasts with her
hands." (PSI, p.2.) Nevertheless, just two to three hours later, while at AC.'s
home, Flowers began making out with AC. and the two removed their clothes.
(PSI, p.2.) After they were both naked, Flowers "pushed his penis into [AC.'s]
mouth," where she allowed it to remain for approximately 15 seconds. (PSI, p.2.)
Flowers then inserted his penis into AC.'s vagina and had unprotected sexual
intercourse with her. (PSI, p.2.)
Although Flowers has never before been convicted of a sex offense, his
conduct in this case is in keeping with history of generally victimizing others. His
criminal record includes convictions for criminal mischief, residential entry, three
batteries, use of telephone to terrify/harass, malicious injury to property, stalking,
trespass, and violation of a no contact order. (PSI, pp.4-5.) In addition, although
the charges were dismissed, police received information from two other girls that
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Flowers had sexually abused them within the same week he had sexual
intercourse with A.C. (R., pp.27, 31, 79-80.)
In a mental health evaluation prepared at Flowers' request, the evaluator
.,

concluded it was unlikely that Flowers suffers from a severe and reliably
diagnosable mental illness.

(Mental Health Assessment, p.1.) The evaluator

determined, instead, that "Flowers' unresolved issues primarily appear to be his
resentment towards authority and poor boundary issues with females." (Mental
Health Assessment, p.3.) The evaluator continued:
He reports prior behavioral pattems of destroying females' property
after challenging issues emerged during the relationship. when
queried as to how violence toward females' possessions had
graduated into his participation into physical aggression toward
females, he became somewhat minimal in his expressions and
responses.
.... It appears that the above mentioned unresolved issues are
negatively impacting his social, familial, and legal functioning.
(Mental Health Assessment, p.3.) The presentence investigator concurred with
the evaluator's assessment of Flowers' mental condition and concluded, "This
poor boundary issue with females coupled with his resentment towards authority
is very concerning as it presents alarming concerns for any and all young
females." (PSI, p.11.)
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court considered the
nature of the offense, the harm done to the victim, and the risk Flowers presents
to the community. The court stated, "It has to be a punishment to deter you from
doing this again and, perhaps, others.

It there [sic] has to be - I have to

consider the protection of society and rehabilitation. I also have to consider the
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effect your conduct had on the victim here" (12/15/08 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-17), and
ultimately concluded, "I think this conduct here, and your conduct, doesn't
warrant you being placed on probation and it certainly doesn't warrant receiving
a rider. It warrants a correctional institution" (12/15/08 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9).
Flowers does not dispute any of the information in the PSI or materials
before the court at sentencing. Nevertheless, he contends that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing a 15-year sentence, with five years fixed,
because, according to Flowers, "all the goals of sentencing could have been
accomplished with a rider, or at worst, the 10 year sentence recommended by
;""

the state."

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

That Flowers believes a lesser sentence

would have achieved the goals of sentencing does not, however, show an abuse
of discretion. On appeal, the question is not what sentence Flowers would have
like the court to have imposed, or even what sentence this Court would have

I,

imposed, but rather, whether the sentence was excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 22627 (2008) (citing State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.
App. 1982)). In light of Flowers' conduct in this case, his unresolved boundary
issues and resentment toward authority, and his long history of generally
victimizing other people, the district court could and did reasonably determine
that a unified 15-year sentence, with five years fixed, was necessary to achieve
the goals of sentencing.
Flowers' claim (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8) that the district court did not
adequately articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence it did also fails to
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show an abuse of discretion.

First, as set forth above, the district court did

articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence and, in doing so, specifically
considered the objectives of deterrence, rehabilitation and protection of society.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that the court did not articulate
its reasoning to Flowers' satisfaction does not show the sentence was arbitrary.
Even where the "sentencing judge has set forth no reasons for the imposition of
a particular sentence, [the appellate court] will draw [its] own impressions from
the record and affirm what [it] infer[s] to be a reasonable exercise of the lower
court's discretion in pronouncing the sentence under review." State v. Martinez,
122 Idaho 158,163,832 P.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 1997). Because the sentence
imposed by the district court in this case is supported by the record, Flowers has
failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Flowers' sentence
and the district court's order denying Flowers' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 6th day of May 2010.

.Q
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney G neral
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